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The model in this paper integrates the possibility of misinforma-
tion into consumer utility theory. If the utility realized from a good
differs from the utility anticipated at time of purchase, shifts in demand
would occur, and thus changes in consumer surplus. These changes provide
a measure of the cost of misinformation or value of improved information.
The empirical analysis yields estimates of the private and social cost of
inaccuracies in automobile buyerst pre-purchase mileage estimates. If
automobile purchases are based on imperfect gasoline mileage information,
a discrepancy results between expected and actual fuel-efficiency. The
data source is a survey of 1980 model car buyers conducted by the authors.THE COST OF INACCURATE AUTOMOBILE
MILEAGE INFORMATION
Traditional economic theory assumes consumers possess perfect
information. In reality, this assumption is rarely fulfilled, In this
paper a model is presented which relaxes this assumption and explicitly
introduces the possibility of imperfect information into the theory of
consumer behavior. Specifically, the focus is on a situation where, due
to inaccurate information, the utility realized from a good can be different
from the utility anticipated during the budget allocation process.
When a consumer’s purchase decision is based on imperfect knowledge
about a good, the utility actually realized from consumption of the prod-
uct may differ from the utility previously anticipated or perceived.
Consumer demand for a product can be envisioned as shifting when consumers
discover the true nature of the goods they have purchased.
in the demand function produce changes in consumer surplus
used to measure the economic losses generated by imperfect
The demand shifts yield both a private transfer and a dead





This analysis is related to earlier work, particularly that of
Peltzman (1973), who in evaluating drug regulations made an important
conceptual contribution to analyzing the welfare effects of imperfect
information. Kotowitz and Mathewson (1979) allowed for differences in
perceived and realized characteristics of products. In addition, Auld
(1972) and Colantoni, Davis and Swaminuthan (1976) analyzed the effects
of misinformation about product characteristics on consumer demand and
subsequent welfare. However, this study is the first which integratesthe possibility of imperfect information directly into the utility
maximization process.
With sharply increased gasoline prices, consumers are placing
increasingly greater emphasis on fuel-efficiency as a characteristic in
the automobiles they purchase. This heightened concern about fuel-
economy places increased importance in the purchase decision on accurate
information concerning gasoline mileage. Purchases based on imperfect
gas mileage information will result in a discrepancy between the perceived
or expected pre-purchase mileage and the actual or realized post-purchase
mileage. If the realized mileage is less than the expected mileage, the
cost of operating the vehicle will be greater than anticipated. If the
realized mileage is greater than the expected level, the cost of operation
will be reduced. The difference between the perceived and realized
mileage figure can be translated into a present discounted value of addi-
tional expenditure or savings on gasoline.
The application of the model developed in this study provides a minimum
monetary estimate of the private and social cost of inaccurate mileage
estimates. The empirical analysis is based on a survey of new car buyers
carried out by the authors in Hennepin County, Minnesota in September 1980.
A final result of this research is an estimate for the United States of
the value to consumers and to society of improved mileage information.
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
The Utility Functions
The utility perceived by the individual from consuming a vector of
goods and services X = (xl, .... Xn) & % in R; is denoted as:3
(1) up =
Perceived preferences on the set
transitive, continuous, strictly
U(X; Me).
~ are assumed complete, reflexive,
convex and strongly monotonic. The
parameters of (1) are given by the vector Mo. This vector can be viewed
as reflecting a consumer’s preferences which depend upon his or her access
to information about the goods and services in % at the time of their
acquisition. Hence, M. can be viewed as embodying a consumer’s state of
knowledge of the utility obtainable from X c ~. Let,
(2) u= U(x; M}




utility obtainable from the goods in X.
are now reflected by the parameter vector M.
of preferences stated above are assumed to
remain unchanged. Thus, (1) and (2) differ only in that the elements of M
can differ from the corresponding elements of MO. If the consumer possessed




with perfect information chooses vector X* to maxitize
Y- p’x= ()




With incomplete or inaccurate information, the consumer chooses vector XO
to maximize (1) subject to (3) and obtains
(l’) U“ = (X”; Me).
P
However, upon consuming X*, the consumer realizes utility based on the
“true” function (2) with parameter vector M. Hence, realized utility isglven by:
(4)
Thus, (1) and (2) yield
($’) and realized (Ue).
O>*
‘j. 2 ‘i.” The vector XO is
maximization of ,(2) since,
Hence,
(5) Ll”=
u’ = U(x”; M).
,
three states of utility, optimum (Ux), perceived
If M # MO for any element, say mi, then
only a feasible solution to the constrained
by construction, X* is an optimal solution.
U(XO; M) < U(X*; M) = U*
1
4 The inequality between realized Ue and the optimal state Ufisuggests a
f
measure for the value of information. The loss in welfare, U% - Ue, can
i
I be viewed as the maximum value of information, in utility terms, yielding
perfect knowledge of M,
Perceived utility (U;) may be greater
1
(U”) depending on the values of
~
(6) u; = U(x”;
However, since M and M. reflect
I
!
cannot exist simultaneously for
M. relative
Mo) ~ U(XO;
or less than realized utility
to M, i.e.,
M) = u!
mutually exclusive states of knowledge which
the consumer, no a priori comparison between
I \ perceived utility (U;) and optimum utility (U*) can be made.
:
i5
Measurement of the Cost of “Inaccurate Information
The next task is to provide a measure of losses in consumer welfare
which occur when the consumer chooses X“ and then discovers that X* is
preferred. The problems of using consumer surplus as an
of consumer welfare are relatively well known. Chipman
and others have shown that constant marginal utility of
necessary and sufficient condition for compensating and
exact measure
and Moore (1979)
income is both a
equivalent varia-
tion and consumer surplus to be equivalent and precise ,measures of changes





of income , which simplifies
measures of welfare for the
section, we assume constant
the following exposition of
problem considered in this
Let the indirect utility function corresponding to the constrained
maximization of perceived utility (l’), be denoted as:
U“= V(P, Y; Mo)
P
and let the indirect utility function corresponding to (2’) be denoted as:
U* = V(P, Y; M).
If (1) represents the consumer’s beliefs, then the perceived
Marshallian demand functions corresponding to (1’) are:
av(.p, Y; Mo) av(p, Y; Mo)
(1”) x: = Vi (P, Y; Mo) = - ap / 3Y
, for all i,
i
which can differ from the Marshallian demand functions corresponding to
(2’):
av(p, Y; M) av(p, Y; M)
(2”) x:= Vi (P, Y; M) = - ap / 3Y , for all i,
i6
If XO are data, then it is the perceived functions which are observable
where M. underlies the parameters we frequently attempt to empirically
estimate. If information and experience cause consumer beliefs to change,
then the perceived demand functions are not structural in an econometric
sense.
Consumer surplus with perfect knowledge of M is:
‘k b
Cs; = ~fxi V~l(X, Y; M)dxi - pix~ = ~pi Vi(P, Y; M)dpi
Pi
where Vi is the Marshallian demand function (2’’), ’V~1 is its price inverse
and p! is some price of xi for which xi ~ O.
1
If M. # M, then it is
possible for any good to be either underconsumed or overconsumed relative
to the optimal choice. The case of underconsumption is illustrated in
Figure la. where x; is given by (1”) for j=i at price p.. Consumer
J
e
surplus realized (CSj) from the choice X“ is:
j
o b
Cs; = ~fxj v~l (X, Y; M)dxj ‘pjX; = ~fpj Vj(P, Y; M)dpj + (~j - pj)x;.
j
This value is equal to the area pbp ba in Figure la. It follows from (5)
33
that CS~ - Cs; ~ o. Hence, the maximum welfare gain from exact knowledge
of M with respect to a single good x. is, in value terms,
J
w. = Cs; - Cs;.
J
This value is equal to p~pjc - p~pjba, which yields the triangle abc in
Figure la.
Consumer surplus realized when x: ~ x: at price ps is illustrated in
Figure lb. In the case of overconsumption,
o b
Cs: = OtfxsV~l(X, Y; M)dx - psx: = ~fps V~(P, Y; M)dps - (Ps-;s)x: s s7
f
;
which is equivalent to the triangle p~p~a (consumer surplus with perfect
knowledge of M) less the right hand triangle adb, The welfare loss from
the overconsumption of
This value is equal to
The implications
a single good are more
x is given by: s
Ws = Cs: e - cs~
the triangle adb in Figure l.b.s’
of an allocative error in the consumer’s choice of
far reaching, however. Due to the budget constraint,
a nonoptimal expenditure on a single good induces nonoptimal expenditure on
other goods and services. Hence, it follows that the total value of
consumer welfare gain from exact knowledge of M is the summation of the
gains l; Wi over all goods and services in ~. The larger the budget share
of the good for which the consumer’s knowledge of M is incomplete, the
greater can be the error induced in the choice of other goods. The estima-
tion of a single Wi is, therefore, a lower bound to the total gain from
exact knowledge of M.
In addition to the possible allocative welfare loss, either consumers
or producers of specific goods may incur a private transfer loss under
conditions of imperfect information. If the good’s attributes are over-
evaluated due to imperfect information and overconsumption occurs,
consumers may suffer a transfer loss to producers. If the good’s attributes
are underevaluated and underconsumption occurs, producers may suffer a
transfer loss to consumers.
In the case of underconsumption in Figure la. the transfer is from
producers to consumers and is equivalent to the rectangular area, $jpjba.
With M. # M, the demand function Vj(P,Y;Mo) yielded purchases of x; at the
price pj. However , with perfect information, the demand function Vj (P,y;M)
---8
would be applicable. Consumers would then have been willing to purchase
the quantity x; at the higher price ~.. Under conditions of perfect infor-
J
mation M = M, producers could have still sold x; but received revenue equal
o
to ~jOx~a, rather than p.Ox!b. Therefore, the area ~,p ba represents the
3J Jj
sum of the potential undercharges on the quantities actually purchased.
In the case of overconsumption in Figure lb. the transfer is from
consumers to producers and is equal to the area ps~sdb. With M. # M, the
demand function Vs(P,Y;Mo) yielded a quantity of x: at the price ps.
Under perfect information with the demand function Vs(P,Y;M) purchases of
o
x could only be achieved at the lower price ps. Producers could have s
only derived the total
of psOx~b. Therefore,
In the empirical
revenue ~sOx~d from the quantity x“, not revenues
consumers have overpaid the amount ps~sdb.
analysis, geometry is used to determine the area of
the allocative loss triangle and potential transfer rectangle. The area of
triangle abc and adb in Figure la. and b. may be derived as one-half of the change
in quantity times the change in price (1/2AxAp). The elasticity formula
(Ax/Apop/x) can be solved for Ax and that value substituted into the
triangle area formula. If the quantity (x), the price change (Ap) and an
estimate of the price elasticity of demand (ep) are known, the area of the
allocative loss triangle may be derived as:
2
e xAp
abc or adb = p
2p
The area of the potential transfer rectangle, ~jpjba or ps~sdb, is equiva-








for model year 1980 automobiles in Hennepin County, Minnesota
Minnesota State Department of Public Safety. This county
the city of Minneapolis, its suburbs, and some outlining rural
areas. The names of 800 new car buyers were selected in a random process
from the,registration listing. Buyers of both domestic and foreign auto-
mobiles were included, but corporate car owners were excluded. Of the
questionnaires mailed to these 800 individuals, 440 were returned, of
which 391 were usable in the context
owners were asked the specific model
gallon (MPG) they expected to obtain
the MPG they actually experienced in
of the present analysis. The vehicle
of their vehicle, the miles per
when they purchased the car, and
normal
asked to report the total miles the vehicle
addition to questions concerning the source
expected gas mileage.
driving. They were also
is driven annually, in
of their information regarding
The difference between the individual’s expected and realized mileage
was calculated. The average absolute error was 2.9 MPG. Some 139 individuals,
36 percent, underestimated their realized mileage; 182, 46 percent, over-
estimated mileage, and in 70 cases> 18 percents the expected and realized
figures were equal. The average underestimate was 3.7 MPG. The average
overestimate 3.6 MPG. Thirty-six percent of the car buyers errored in
their esttiate of the actual mileage by more than 3 MPG. In 13 percent
of the cases the error was greater than 5 MPG. Some 14 percent of the
buyers received more than 3 MPG better than expected, whereas 22 percent
overestimated their actual mileage by more than 3 MPG.
-10
Additional Data and Assumptions
The next step was
and the realized figure
gasoline purchases will
to translate the mileage gap between the anticipated
into a monetary value. Unexpected savings on
be incurred if the pre-purchase estimate under-
stated actual mileage and unexpected additional costs if the estimate
overstated actual mileage, assuming miles driven remain constant. To
translate the mileage difference into a monetary value required data on
the length of operation of the vehicle, the miles driven per year, and
the price of fuel. For a given discount rate, the present discounted
value of the future stream of gasoline expenditures could then be derived.
Since assumptions about the future must be made, including something so
uncertain as the future price of gasoline, the approach of this study
was to specify a set of alternative assumptions.
With regard to the time period over which the vehicle will be
operated, two alternatives were utilized. In the first case, the average
length of time a new car is operated before replacement was used. The
best estimate available for this period is 3-1/2 years, based on a 1968
4/
study.— Data also exist on yearly travel of passenger cars by age
of vehicle. The average new passenger car, as reported in a 1977 study,
was driven 18,000 miles in the first year, 15,100 in the second, 13,400
in the third, and 12,200 in the fourth
At these rates the average new car was
3-1/2 years. Both the short ownership
year (Dept. of Energy, 1977, p. 97).
driven 52,600 miles in the first
period and high mileage in the initial
years is in large part due to the sizable portion of new vehicles which are
purchased for business use. In the second case, therefore, to better
reflect the private purchaser’s situation, the assumption was made that
-..11
the original owner keeps the car until 52,600 miles are reached at their
individual annual mileage rates, or that the car is held for a maximum of
eight years. The latter assumption was necessary for individuals with
very low annual mileage in order to avoid unduly long ownership periods.
Two alternatives were also selected for discount rates. First,
the average interest rate was used for a 36-month new car loan at a local
bank in the survey area. The rate was averaged over the 12 months of the
1980 model year, October 1979 through September 1980, which yielded an
interest rate of 13.29 percent. Second, the average interest rate paid by
local banks on 2-1/2 year savings certificates was also used. That rate
5/
averaged 10.20 percent during the 1980 model year period.—
Three alternative assumptions were made regarding gasoline price
changes. Calculations were made assuming price increases of 10, 15, and 20
percent per year. The annual increase in the price of gasoline averaged
16 percent over the five-year period from December 1975 to December 1980
6/
based on the Consumer Price Index.–
An average price of $1.19 per gallon for unleaded gasoline was used
as the base price during the 1980 car model year. This price was the
average price in the Minneapolis-St. Paul metropolitan area during the
period from October 1, 1979 to September 30, 1980. A private newsletter
f~r petroleum marketers, “Petroleum Market Data” reports gasoline prices
weekly for the Minnesota area. The price of unleaded regular was used
since most new cars require this fuel. A small number of the vehicles
in the survey had diesel engines. The average price of diesel fuel during
the model year in Minnesota was $1.09 per gallon based on the same source.
-.12
Empirical Calculations of Cost
With these assumptions, alternative estimates of the present value
of unexpected gasoline savings or additional expenditures due to the gap
between expected and realized fuel-economy could be calculated. This
unexpected savings or increase in the operating cost of the vehicle would
shift the “true” demand function, based on perfect information, up or down,
respectively, in relation to the demand function based on imperfect mileage
perceptions.
/’
For the case in
distance ab in Figure
reduction in gasoline
which the consumer underestimates actual mileage, the
la. is equal to the present value of the unexpected
expenditures. This dollar amount represents an
unexpected private gain or savings to the individual. If the purchaser
overestimates actual mileage, the distance bd in Figure lb. measures the
present value of the unexpected increase in gasoline expenditure. This
amount is the private cost of misinformation to the individual.
In Figure la. , if the consumer had perfect mileage information,
instead of an underestimate, he or she would have been willing to pay the
additional amount (~jpj) for Ox; units. In Figure lb., with perfect
information instead of an overestimate, he or she would have only been
willing to pay ~s for Ox: units. Consequently, the present discounted
value of unanticipated savings on gasoline can be conceived of as a rebate
reducing the purchase price of the vehicle by an equivalent amount.
Unanticipated additional gas expenditures can be viewed as a surcharge
increasing the purchase price. For instance, suppose the purchaser of a
vehicle underestimated actual mileage by 3,5 MPG and, hence, receives an
unexpected discounted gain of $640 on the operating costs of his or her
car. Therefore, if possible choices among other goods and services are13
ignored, he or she would have been willing to pay a retail price $640
higher for the auto. This study assu -co.nSumerspossess perfect --—.-...,.. -,.. —x . .. . . .
information about other vehicle characteristics, so that the effect of MPG
,., -., ., - . . . . . . . . .... . -.-. . . . .
t .—,- . . ...=. ~.. -. -
misinformation can be isolated,,.,,..
-“---------—-------””--’”- ““”- .,. .. x., ~._—.——.——
In the case of this analysis the individual car buyer purchases a
single vehicle or one unit of automobile in quantity terms. Therefore,
the total private cost or gain for the individual is simply equal to the
present value of the extra expenditure or savings on gasoline consumption,
the distance ab or bd, because the multiplication is simply by the one
original unit. The amount of automobile purchased can also be measured in
value terms , and the purchase price used as a normalizing factor. With
this approach, one can conceive of more or less than one unit of automobile.
For example, suppose the price of a specific vehicle chosen as a base, with
a given set of options, is $6,500. If the addition of options raises the
price to $7,500, you have 1.15 of the original units. In Figure la.,
therefore, x; represents one unit of automobile; points to the right of x;
are more than one unit, Likewise in Figure lb., if x: represents one
unit, points to the left are less than one unit. This conceptual viewpoint
is important to the notion of Ax embodied in the calculation of the alloca-
tive loss triangle.
To calculate the allocative loss, data on prices and the elasticity
of demand are required. Prices for 120 automobile makes and models are
reported in the April 1980 automotive issue of Consumer Reports. The
prices utilized in this study were derived by averaging the dealer cost
and list price with the options CU suggests buying for each car. This
averaging was done to reflect the discounting from list price that typically
occurs on new car sales.14
For a price elasticity, the overall elasticity of demand for auto-
mobiles was used. Gregory Chow estimated elasticities of demand of -.601,
-1.11, and -.950 depending on the specific regression used (Chow, 1960,
pp. 158-159). He concluded that the price elasticity ranged between
-0.6 and -1.0 (Chow, 1960, p. 160). Houthakker and Taylor (1966) obtained
a short-run price elasticity estimate of -.9578 with a dynamic model and
a figure of -.92 with a semi-log static equation evaluated at the mean.
In the context of a dynamic demand system D. Weiserbs obtained an
estimated long-run elasticity of -1.35 (Phlips, 1974, p. 195). Sexauer
(1977), using a partial adjustment model, obtained estimates of -1.04 and
-1.05 for the long-run elasticity using annual and monthly data. Based
on all these studies, the most reasonable estimate of a price elasticity
for automobiles was deemed to be -1.00,
RESULTS
Estimates of the Costs of Inaccurate Information
Table 1 presents the allocative loss and private costs or gains
for the average purchaser of a vehicle in our survey based on various
assumptions. The authors suggest that Alternative 1 probably embodies
the most reasonable set of assumptions. Alternative 1 contains the
assumption of a 15 percent annual gasoline price increase, 13.29 percent
discount rate, and a sufficient period of time to place 52,600 miles on
the car or a maximum of eight yearsj whichever occurs first. With these
assumptions, the average allocative loss per automobile purchased was
$86. For those who overestimated their MPG the private cost was $752
and for those who underestimated their MPG the unexpected savings was $749.15
Although the private cost and gain are almost equal, they do not cancel
each other out because they occur to different individuals.
The other alternatives in Table 1 are useful for estimating the
sensitivity of these results to various assumptions. The only change
in assumptions which has a marked impact on the results occurs in
Alternative 5. In that alternative a period of ownership of 3.5 years
was assumed, which significantly reduces the estimated impact.
The next step was to extrapolate these results to the national
7/
level.– During the period October 1, 1979 to September 30, 1980, which
approximates the 1980 model year, 9,174,556 automobiles were sold in the
United States. This count includes both domestic and foreign vehicles.
Automotive sales were depressed in 1980; in a normal sales year over
10 million vehicles are sold. Our survey covers individual purchasers
who use their vehicle for either personal or business purposes or a
combination. One might assume that large volume business purchases are
based on better information than individual purchases. Both the experience




the information base of small business purchasers is likely not
than for individuals. Therefore, we excluded the 16 percent
sales that are to large businesses, but includeclall others in
our national estimate, which yields a sales level of 7.7 million cars
(Flanagan).
Based on the results for Alternative 1 in Table 1, the estimated
national allocative loss would be $662 million on sales of 7.7 million auto-
mobiles. As previously reported, in our survey 46 percent cjfthe respondents
overestimated MPG and 36 percent underestimated actual MPG. These propor-16
tions and the values in Alternative 1 can also be expanded to the national
level at this sales rate. The aggregate private-cost to auto buyers who
overestimated mileage would be $2.66 billion. The aggregate nationwide
gain to car buyers who underestimated mileage would be $2.08 billion. The
former figure is in effect a transfer from consumers to producers. The.
latter represents a transfer from producers to consumers. The net transfer
is approximately $580 million from consumers to producers.
The net transfer concept is of limited usefulness, since the transfers
to and from consumers do not really cancel each other out. They occur on
different vehicles and to different consumers. The allocative error repre-
sents a significant social welfare loss due to misinformation, which is not
recouped by
a potential
any market segment. Improved mileage information could have
social value at least as great as that estimate.
Factors Affecting the Accuracy of Mileage Estimates
Survey respondents were also asked to indicate the sources of infor-
mation about gasoline mileage used prior to purchasing their
asked which source of information was most important. Table
nine response categories regarding
information. Column (2) gives the
Column (3) lists the absolute mean
gives the percent in each category




percent in the sample in each category.
MPG error for each category. Column (4)
who underestimated their actual
mileage and Column (5) lists the average MPG error for the underestimators.
Column (6) and (7) provide the same data for those who overestimated their
mileage. The difference between 100 percent and the percent listed who
underestimated and overestimated mileage in Columns (4) and (6) equals
the proportion in each category who made no error in their mileage forecast.
Their estimated and realized mileage were equal.17
The results in Table 2 indicate that the most widely used sources
of mileage information were automobile evaluation reports, friends and
relatives, and auto magazines, in that order. The most accurate information
was, not surprisingly, previous experience with a similar automobile. The
least reliable information was provided by other owners and the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) fuel-efficiency ratings, although the number in each
group was small. For the entire sample, the average mileage error of those
who underestimated and overestimated MPG was very close. However, when
broken down by primary information source, the mean MPG error between the
two groups differed substantially in several cases.
The results regarding the utilization and reliability of the EPA
ratings as an information source are of particular interest from a policy
perspective. The EPA ratings are widely published as official government
figures. They are extensively referred to in the advertising of new auto-
mobiles. By law each new automobile must bear a label giving the EPA
nileage information.
The EPA.mileage estimates are typically presented with the cautionary
note that they are best used for comparisons, that “actual mileage may vary
due to driving speed, weather, and trip length,” and that “actual highway
mileage will probably be less.” However, both the automotive manufacturers
and the EPA use the estimates in a manner that would seem to indicate that
they represent the mileage the average motorist should expect to obtain,
The survey indicates that the EPA ratings are not widely used, but for
good reason, they are not very reliable, Only 7 percent of the individuals
in our survey used the EPA estimates as their primary source of mileage
information. H~,,~ever, since automobile advertisements are required to use the
EPA fuel-economy figures, adding that group brings to 13 percent the number
who used EPA based information. .Another 13 percent relied on dealers,18
an information source which is probably closely related to the EPA ratings.
Of particular interest from the consumers’ perspective is the balance
between underestimates and overestimates with these sources. In each
the three cases, the proportion who overestimated mileage, and hence
suffered unexpected additional operating costs, is more than twice as
of
great
as the percent who underestimated their MPG. For the entire sample, the
portion who overestimated is only slightly greater than the proportion who
underestimated mileage.
Table 3 recombines some of the information categories so that the
mean MPG errors can be tested to see if the differences between categories




used the EPA ratings vs. those who utilized other information
numbers in parentheses indicate the significance level at
means may be considered statistically different. In testing
the two means, the assumption that
variance was tested first. If the
rejected, we used a revised t test
the samples have a common population
hypothesis of common variances was
suggested by Li for use when the two
population variances are markedly different and sample sizes are also
different (Li, pp. 142-143). Case 2 combined the EPA ratings and advertise-
ments together for a comparison with other information sources.
In both cases in Table 3, the EPA based information led to larger
mileage errors than other sources. This result is true for those who
underestimated and overestimated fuel-economy and also in terms of the
absolute MPG error for all consumers. For overestimates, the means are
statistically different at a high level of significance in both Case 1
and 2. The absolute MPG errors can probably be assumed to be statistically19
different, although the significance level is only moderate. For those
who underestimated MPG, the null hypothesis of similar average errors
cannot be rejected.
These results bring into serious question the utility of the EPA
ratings to the individual automobile buyer. The reliability of EPA
estimates should be of particular concern from the consumer perspective.
Our data suggest that they lead to an overestimate of actual mileage in
a high proportion of cases. In addition, the error for those who over-
estimate is higher for those who use EPA information than other sources,
and the difference is significant. Recall that those who overestimate
mileage face the unpleasant shock after buying their car of discovering




calculation of the private and social costs of MPG
miles driven remain unchanged in response to unexpected
savings or added expenditure on gasoline. Recent evidence tends to indicate
that annual mileage is quite responsive to gasoline prices and expenditures.
The average miles traveled per passenger car per year in the U.S. was
10,046 miles in 1978 (Dept. of Transportation, 1979). The figure fell to
9,390 miles in 1980 (Business Week, p. 16). The average driver could be
expected to adjust miles driven in reaction to an unexpected savings or
extra expenditure on gasoline, thus reducing the dollar loss or gain
estimated in this analysis. However, shifting miles driven would affect
the individual’s utility level. By holding annual mileage unchanged, the
utility loss or gain from inaccurate information could be translated into
a monetary estimate.20
On the other hand, there is a conceptual reason for arguing the values
of the allocative loss and transfer are likely underestimated. The shifts
in demand captured in this study are a result only of the monetary gain or
loss due to the unanticipated gasoline savings or additional cost. The
pleasant surprise of receiving better mileage than expected might have a
direct positive impact on consumer utility. The disappointing shock of
getting worse mileage could have a direct negative effect. Consumer utility
might also be directly affected by the unexpected conserving or using of
more energy for other reasons , such as contributing to national energy
independence.
Finally, the loss is understated since the best that could be done
empirically was to calculate the loss on
a nonoptimal choice on one good produces
services through the budget constraint.
each vehicle in isolation. However,
misallocation on other goods and
To the extent that mileage misin-
formation causes consumers to purchase the wrong vehicle given their
preferences, rather than to not purchase one at all, much of the ensuing
additional misallocation is within the automotive group. In sum, ours is
a partial rather than a general equilibrium
CONCLUSIONS
analysis.
This study yields both general theoretical and specific empirical
results. The latter have significant public policy implications. The
theoretical developments have broad applicability as a conceptual struc-
ture. The bibliography on the economics of information has grown quite
long. However, revision of the fundamental theory of consumer behavior
to encompass the possibility of imperfect information has not previously21
been carried out. This study attempts to partially fill that gap. As
Green (1978) states in Consumer Theory:
We suggest, without having anything original to offer, that
the theory could be improved if the information available
to consumers and their interactions were taken into account
(p. 29).
The assumption of perfect knowledge excessively restricts the ability of
the traditional theory to explain consumer behavior,
This paper develops a conceptual framework for analyzing the losses
due to imperfect information. The value of perfect information is equal
to the losses incurred in its absence. Furthermore, it was shown that
utility realized from the consumption of goods and services acquired with
less than perfect knowledge can never be greater than the utility received
from products selected with perfect knowledge. Among the important impli-
cations of this theory is that observed demand functions, if consumer
information is imperfect , may not be structural and cannot be expected
to hold across different states of knowledge.
In terms of public policy, this analysis has demonstrated the very
sizable economic benefits that accurate automobile fuel-economy estimates
could have. With the dramatic increase in the price of gasoline over the
last several years, accurate fuel mileage information has become
increasingly valuable. Contingent on a set of assumptions, the welfare
loss due to allocative error was estimated at $86 on the average 1980
automobile purchased. In the survey, 36 percent of the individuals under-
estimated their realized mileage and 46 percent overestimated their
actual MPG. For the former group, the average discounted value of
unexpected gasoline savings was $749. For the latter group, the average
discounted value of the unexpected extra expenditure on gasoline was $752.22
These figures translate into an allocative loss of $662 million, a transfer
to consumers of $2.08 billion , and a transfer to producers of $2.66 billion
for 1980 car sales in the U.S.
The data on sources of information used by consumers showed the EPA
fuel-economy ratings to be particularly unreliable. This conclusion
reinforces statements made in a recent House Committee on Government
Operation evaluation of the EPA mileage estimates. The chairman of the
House Subcommittee producing the report concluded that “individual
consumers are being misled by inflated fuel economy claims derived from
their government’s own test program” (House of Representatives, 1980).
That study concluded by recommending specific reforms for the EPA’s present
methods, If the government is going to provide fuel-economy ratings, the
obligation exists to make the mileage estimates as accurate as possible.
The fuel-efficiency estimates publicized should reflect as closely as
possible the actual on-the-road mileage the average motorist can anticipate.
Only with accurate information can consumers make the right purchase deci-
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Willig (1973) also shows that compensating and equivalent varia-
tions are the relevant surplus concepts
analysis and that either can be closely
surplus areas of the Marshallian demand
91
for cost-benefit and welfare
approximated by the consumer
curve.
“ This is a strong assumption. Three conditions under which it
holds are outlined by Samuelson (1942). One of the three that would also
be useful to assume is that all income elasticities are unitary, a result
obtained by assuming homoethetic
of these assumptions is that the




preferences. The practical implication
Marshallian and the Hicksian demand curves
in consumer surplus are identical to
variation.
parallel shifts in the demand function are
assumed. T%is is not theoretically necessary nor necessarily realistic.
Changes from M. to M could change the elasticity as well as the level of
demand.
&/ Conversation with Mr. R. Grehher, Motor Vehicle Manufacturers
Association, Detroit, Michigan, April 1980. Admittedly, there are many
factors, such as the state of the economy, gasoline prices, and new car
prices, that could possibly increase or decrease this period.
~’ Before January 1980, the 2-1/2 year certificate of deposit did
not exist, but a 4-year certificate did and the rate on it was used.
&/
Currently, the oil market situation looks like the price
increases for petroleum products may slack off over the next couple ofyears. However, events can change very rapidly and dramatically in the
world petroleum market. During the two-year period, December 1978 to
December 1980, the price of gasoline increased at a 35 percent annual rate.
Projecting price increases for gasoline which are greater than the relevant
interest rates is not unreasonable. Commercial gasoline storage is costly
and stocking significant quantities is unfeasible for the average individual.
~1
Based on the types and quantities of automobiles purchased, the
Hennepin County sample was assumed to be reasonably representative of
national new car purchases. A check could not be made concerning the
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mmmm N Ucfl NmrlTABLE 3. Mileage Errors Tested for Significance of Differences
Information Mean Absolute Mean MPG Mean MPG
Source MPG Error Underestimate Overestimate
Case 1.
a) EPA ratings 3.83 .5.36 4.60
b) All other sources 2.88 3.64 3.38
(Significance Level) (.15)~’ (.30)~’ (.025)~’
Case 2.
a) EPA ratings & ads











1/ – Based on a revised t test.
2/ – Based on a normal t test.